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Abstract
In this paper, we study the probability of successful deception of an uncompressed biometric
authentication system with side information at the adversary. It represents the scenario where the
adversary may have correlated side information, e.g., a partial finger print or a DNA sequence of a
relative of the legitimate user. We find the optimal exponent of the deception probability by proving
both the achievability and the converse. Our proofs are based on the connection between the problem
of deception with side information and the rate distortion problem with side information at both the
encoder and decoder.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
The biometric authentication problem has been studied extensively in recent years. In a
biometric authentication system, a biometric feature, e.g., a finger print, a DNA sequence, etc.,
of a legitimate user is measured and the measurement, called enrollment, is stored in a database.
Later this biometric feature of the same user is measured and compared with the enrollment
for authentication. Due to the randomness in the process, different measurements of the same
biometric features of the same person can not be exactly the same. Thus, the authentication
system needs to tolerate a certain level of distortion between the measurements taken in the
enrollment stage and the authentication stage.
In a biometric authentication system, successful deception happens when an adversary imper-
sonates a legitimate user by faking a biometric feature close enough to the enrollment and then
deceives the authentication system. The first study on the deception probability in the biometric
authentication system is [1], where the authors studied the deception in an authentication system
where the enrollment is compressed. The authors obtained the optimal trade-off between the
compression rate and the exponent of the probability of successful deception when the adversary
has no side information. In the case with correlated side information at the adversary, achievability
and converse results on the optimal trade-off were proposed in the paper, however, they do not
meet. A similar result was obtained in a recent paper [2], where the optimal exponent of the
deception probability has been given in both cases of uncompressed and compressed enrollment
with no side information at the adversary.
A different direction in studying the performance of a biometric authentication system is
to study the maximum number of legitimate users, called capacity, allowed in a biometric
authentication system under a given tolerated distortion level. In [3], the capacity is obtained if
the enrollment is not compressed. Later, the capacity result is generalized to the case where the
enrollment is compressed [4], and the trade-off between the compression rate and the capacity
of the authentication system was studied. The threat of a deception from an adversary was not
considered in this line of work.
In this paper, we study the optimal exponent of the probability of successful deception of
a biometric authentication system with uncompressed enrollment and side information at the
adversary. It represents the scenario where the adversary may have correlated side information,
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3e.g., a partial finger print of the legitimate user or a DNA sequence of a relative of the legitimate
user. We provide the optimal exponent of the deception probability by providing the proofs
of both the achievability and the converse. Our proofs are based on a connection between the
problem of deception with side information and the rate distortion problem with side information
at both the encoder and decoder.
The reminder of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we state the problem formulation
and the main result. The proofs of the achievability and the converse are given in Section III
and IV, respectively. Finally, a conclusion is given in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND MAIN RESULT
A. Problem Formulation
Consider a pair of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random sequences Xn and
Y n, generated according to a joint distribution P , which is defined on a finite space X ×Y . Th
random sequence Xn represents the biometric enrollment in the system and Y n represents the
side information at the adversary. We define a reconstruction space Xˆ and a distortion function
d : X ×Xˆ 7→ R+ ∪{0}. The distortion between the sequences xn ∈ X n and xˆn ∈ Xˆ n is defined
as
d(xn, xˆn) ,
1
n
n∑
i=1
d(xi, xˆi). (1)
The legitimate user is successfully identified if the distortion between the measurements in the
enrollment stage and the authentication stage does not exceed a certain level, say ∆. We note that
the probability of false rejection in our model is the same as the model without side information
at the adversary. Therefore, we refer the readers to [1], [2] for the derivation of the maximal
probability of false rejection.
The adversary observes the side information Y n and tries to impersonate the legitimate user
using a deception function f : Yn 7→ Xˆ n. We define the achievable deception exponent as
follows.
Definition 1 A deception exponent E is achievable under the distortion constraint ∆ if there
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4exists a deception function f such that
−
1
n
logPr(d(Xn, f(Y n)) ≤ ∆+ δ) ≤ E + δ. (2)
In this paper, we are interested in the minimal achievable deception exponent, which is the
best the adversary can do. Based on the minimal achievable deception exponent, the designer of
the biometric authentication system can choose an appropriate ∆ value that on one hand, limits
the probability of successful deception below the tolerance level, and on the other hand, does
not cause too large a probability of false rejection when the legitimate user is authenticated [1],
[2].
B. Rate-distortion with Side Information at Both the Encoder and Decoder
It turns out that finding the minimal achievable deception exponent with side information at
the adversary is intimately related to the rate distortion problem with side information at both
the encoder and decoder [5]. Thus, in this subsection, we review the result for the rate distortion
problem.
Assume a pair of i.i.d sequences Xn and Y n generated according to a joint distribution Q
defined on X × Y , where Q is not necessarily equal to P , which is defined in the previous
subsection. The random sequence Xn is the source sequence to be reconstructed at the decoder
under a certain distortion constraint and Y n represents the side information available at both
the encoder and decoder. The encoding function at the encoder is defined as g : X n × Yn 7→
{1, 2, . . . ,M}, and the decoding function at the decoder is defined as ϕ : {1, 2, . . . ,M}×Yn 7→
Xˆ n. We denote the minimal achievable rate under distortion constraint ∆ in the rate distortion
problem with side information at both the encoder and decoder as RSI(Q,∆). From [5], we
have
RSI(Q,∆) = min
V (xˆ|x,y):Ed(X,Xˆ)≤∆
I(X ; Xˆ|Y ). (3)
Remark: The above rate distortion problem with side information at both the encoder and
decoder can also be viewed as a special case of the Wyner-Ziv problem, i.e., the rate distortion
problem with side information only at the decoder, as follows: in the Wyner-Ziv problem, view
(Xn, Y n) jointly as the source sequence available at the encoder, view Y n as the side information
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5at the decoder, and take the the distortion function in the Wyner-ziv problem as d(x, xˆ), which is
defined in the previous subsection, i.e., the distortion of Y n does not matter. By viewing the rate
distortion problem with side information at both the encoder and decoder as a special case of
the Wyner-Ziv problem, we can invoke the results of the Wyner-Ziv problem, e.g., [6, Theorem
16.5], in later development.
C. Main Result
The main result of this paper is the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The deception exponent E is achievable under the distortion constraint ∆ if and
only if
E ≥ min
Q
{D(Q||P ) +RSI(Q,∆)}, (4)
where RSI(Q,∆) is given in (3), the distribution Q is defined on X ×Y and D(Q||P ) represents
the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the distributions Q and P [6].
In the next two sections, we will show the proofs of the achievability and the converse of
Theorem 1 via the connection between the problem of deception with side information and the
rate distortion problem with side information at both the encoder and decoder.
III. THE ACHIEVABILITY
In this section, we will show that there exists a deception function f that can achieve the the
deception exponent D(Q||P ) + RSI(Q,∆) for the distortion constraint ∆ and the distribution
Q defined on X × Y . We will construct the deception function f from the rate distortion code
with side information at both the encoder and decoder.
First, consider the rate distortion problem with side information at both the encoder and
decoder as defined in subsection II-B, where (Xn, Y n) are generated i.i.d. according to the
distribution Q. Theorem 16.5 in [6] shows that for any sufficiently large n, and 0 < τ < 1, there
exists a length n code that achieves the rate RSI(Q,∆) and satisfies the distortion constraint
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6with probability larger than 1− τ . More specifically, there exists a function pair (g, ϕ) such that
1
n
log ||g|| ≤ RSI(Q,∆) + δ (5)
Pr (d (Xn, ϕ(g(Xn, Y n), Y n)) ≤ ∆+ δ) ≥ 1− τ (6)
Define A ⊂ X n × Yn as the set of sequences (xn, yn) that satisfies the distortion constraint
∆+ δ under (g, ϕ), i.e.,
A , {(xn, yn) ∈X n × Yn : d(xn, ϕ(g(xn, yn), yn)) ≤ ∆+ δ}. (7)
Thus, the inequality in (6) is equivalent to
Qn(A) > 1− τ, (8)
where Qn(A) is the probability that an i.i.d. randomly generated (Xn, Y n) according to the
distribution Q falls in the set A, i.e.,
Qn(A) ,
∑
(xn,yn)∈A
n∏
i=1
Q(xi, yi). (9)
We further define A(Q) as the intersection of the set A with the typical set T n[Q]δ , where the
definition of a typical set can be found in [6, Definition 2.8], i.e.,
A(Q) , A ∩ T n[Q]δ . (10)
From [6, Lemma 2.12], we have
Qn
(
T n[Q]δ
)
≥ 1− ǫn, (11)
and as a result, from (8) and (11), we have
Qn(A(Q)) ≥ Qn(A) +Qn
(
T n[Q]δ
)
− 1 ≥ 1− ǫn − τ. (12)
Thus, from [6, Lemma 2.14], we have
1
n
log |A(Q)| ≥ H(Q)− ǫn. (13)
We further define Ai(Q) ⊂ A(Q) for i = 1, 2, . . . , ||g|| as the set of (xn, yn) sequences that
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7satisfy the distortion constraint when mapped to index i at the encoder, i.e.,
Ai(Q) , {(x
n, yn) ∈ T n[Q]δ : d(x
n, ϕ(i, yn)) ≤ ∆+ δ}. (14)
Since all (xn, yn) sequence pairs that satisfy the distortion constraint ∆+ δ under (g, ϕ) has to
be mapped to an index g(xn, yn), we have
A(Q) =
||g||⋃
i=1
Ai(Q), (15)
Ai(Q) ∩Aj(Q) = ∅ for i 6= j. (16)
We define io as the index of the set Ai(Q) with the largest cardinality, i.e.,
io , arg max
i∈{1,2,...,||g||}
|Ai(Q)|. (17)
Then, we have
|Aio(Q)| ≥
|A(Q)|
||g||
. (18)
Therefore, we have
−
1
n
logP n(Aio(Q)) ≤−
1
n
log
(
|Aio(Q)| min
(xn,yn)∈Aio (Q)
P n((xn, yn))
)
≤−
1
n
log
(
|A(Q)|min(xn,yn)∈Aio (Q) P
n((xn, yn))
||g||
)
(19)
≤−H(Q) + ǫn +RSI(Q,∆) + δ −
1
n
log
(
min
(xn,yn)∈Aio (Q)
P n((xn, yn))
)
(20)
≤−H(Q) + ǫn +RSI(Q,∆) + δ +D(Q||P ) +H(Q) + ǫn (21)
=D(Q||P ) +RSI(Q,∆) + δ + 2ǫn, (22)
where (19) follows from (18), (20) follows from (5) and (13), and (21) follows from [6, Lemma
2.6], i.e., for any (xn, yn) ∈ T n[Q]δ ,
−
1
n
logP n ((xn, yn)) ≤ D(Q||P )−H(Q) + ǫn. (23)
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8Now, we construct the deception function f according to (g, ϕ) described above, i.e.,
f(yn) = ϕ(io, yn). (24)
Then we have
−
1
n
logPr(d(Xn, f(Y n)) ≤ ∆+ δ) =−
1
n
logP n ({(xn, yn) : d(xn, ϕ(io, yn)) ≤ ∆+ δ}) (25)
=−
1
n
logP n(Aio(Q)) (26)
≤D(Q||P ) +RSI(Q,∆) + δ + 2ǫn, (27)
where (25) follows from the construction of f in (24), (26) follows from the definition of Ai(Q)
in (14), and (27) follows from (22).
Thus, we have shown that there exists a deception function f , constructed according to the
encoding and decoding function of the corresponding rate distortion problem with side informa-
tion, that can achieve the the deception exponent D(Q||P ) +RSI(Q,∆) for any distribution Q
defined on X × Y and distortion constraint ∆. This concludes the proof of the achievability.
IV. THE CONVERSE
In this section, we will prove that for any deception function f , the deception exponent
can not be smaller than minQ{D(Q||P ) + RSI(Q,∆)}. This will be proven by contradiction,
i.e., we will show that if there is a deception function with the deception exponent equal to
minQ{D(Q||P ) +RSI(Q,∆)} − α for some α > 0, then we can construct a coding scheme in
the rate distortion with side information problem with achievable rate smaller than RSI(Q,∆),
which is obviously false. In contrast to the achievability, which selects one deception function
f(yn) from many rate distortion decoding functions φ(i, yn), i = 1, 2, · · · , ‖g‖, i.e., (24), the
converse requires us to construct many rate distortion decoding functions φ(i, yn), i = 1, 2, ·, ‖g‖
from one deception function f(yn), which is more difficult.
We first assume a deception function f , which achieves the deception exponent E under
distortion constraint ∆, as defined in (2). The proof of the converse includes the following three
steps.
Step 1 Type selection: In this step, we will select one type among all the types, which contributes
most to the deception probability for the function f .
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9We define a set A ⊂ X n ×Yn as follows
A , {(xn, yn) ∈ X n × Yn : d(xn, f(yn)) ≤ ∆+ δ} . (28)
Based on the definition of set A and the definition of deception exponent in (2), we have that
deception exponent E is achievable is equivalent to
−
1
n
logP n(A) ≤ E + δ. (29)
We further define P as the set of all possible empirical distribution on X n × Yn, i.e.,
P ,
{
Q : Q(x, y) =
i
n
, for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y , i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}
}
. (30)
For any distribution Q ∈ P , we define the set A(Q) as the intersection between the set A and
T nQ , where T nQ is the type of Q as defined in [6, Definition 2.1], i.e.,
A(Q) = A ∩ T nQ . (31)
Thus, we have
A =
⋃
Q∈P
A(Q). (32)
Since the type T nQ for different empirical distributions Q ∈ P are disjoint, we have
P n(A) =
∑
Q∈P
P n(A(Q)). (33)
We define the type Qo as the type which contributes most to the deception probability, i.e.,
Qo , argmax
Q∈P
P n(A(Q)). (34)
Let β by the number of different types in X n × Yn. From (33) and (34), we have
P n(A(Qo)) ≥
P n(A)
β
. (35)
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Thus, we have
−
1
n
logP n(A(Qo)) ≤ −
1
n
log
P n(A)
β
(36)
≤ E + δ +
1
n
log β (37)
< E + ǫn + δ, (38)
where (36) follows from (35), (37) follows from (29), and (38) follows from the fact that
β ≤ (n + 1)|X ||Y| [6, Lemma 2.2].
Since every sequence in the same type is equally probable, we have
P n(A(Qo)) = |A(Qo)|P n(xn, yn), ∀(xn, yn) ∈ T nQo . (39)
Thus, for any sequence pair (xn, yn) ∈ T nQo , we have
1
n
log |A(Qo)| =
1
n
log
P n(A(Qo)
P n(xn, yn)
> −E − ǫn − δ −
1
n
logP n((xn, yn)) (40)
= D(Qo||P ) +H(Qo)−E − ǫn − δ, (41)
where (40) follows from (38), and (41) follows from [6, Lemma 2.6], i.e., for distribution Qo,
−
1
n
logP n((xn, yn)) = D(Qo||P ) +H(Qo), ∀(xn, yn) ∈ T nQo.
Step 2 Permutation: In this step, we will construct a rate distortion code, restricted to the
type Qo, with side information at both the encoder and decoder from the deception function f
via permutations.
We consider the symmetric group Sn, which consists of all the permutations on {1, 2, . . . , n}.
For a set S ⊂ X n, and a permutation π ∈ Sn, define the set π(S) as the set of sequences that
is permuted from the sequences in set S by the permutation π, i.e.,
π(S) , {x¯n ∈ X n : ∃xn ∈ S, π(xn) = x¯n}. (42)
Thus, π(S) is a permuted version of the set S.
We will use the following lemma, proved by Ahlswede in 1980, to obtain a covering of T nQo
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by the permuted versions of A(Qo).
Lemma 1 (Covering Lemma) [7, Section 6.1] For any set S ∈ T nQ , there exist permutations
π1, π2 . . . , πk ∈ Sn with
k⋃
i=1
πi(S) = T
n
Q , (43)
if
k >
|T nQ |
|S|
log |T nQ |. (44)
From the above lemma, by letting Q be Qo and S be A(Qo), we have that there exist permutations
π1, π2 . . . , πk ∈ Sn such that
k⋃
i=1
πi(A(Q
o)) = T nQo , (45)
where k satisfies
1
n
log k =
1
n
log |T nQo| −
1
n
log |A(Qo)|+ log
(
log |T nQo|
)
+ ǫn
≤ E −D(Qo||P ) + 2ǫn + δ +
log(nH(Qo))
n
, (46)
where (46) follows from (41) and the fact that the size of the type |T nQo| satisfies [6, Lemma
2.3]
|T nQo| ≤ exp(nH(Q
o)).
Based on (28) and (31), we have that
A(Qo) =
{
(xn, yn) ∈ T nQo : d(x
n, f(yn)) ≤ ∆+ δ
} (47)
Based on the definition in (1), we see that the same permutation of the two sequences does not
change the distortion between the two sequences. Therefore we have for i = 1, 2, . . . , k
A(Qo) =
{
(xn, yn) ∈ T nQo : d(πi(x
n), πi(f(y
n))) ≤ ∆+ δ
}
. (48)
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From the definition of the permutation of a set in (42), we have
πi(A(Q
o)) =
{
(x¯n, y¯n) ∈ T nQo : ∃(x
n, yn) ∈ A(Qo), (πi(x
n), πi(y
n)) = (x¯n, y¯n)
}
. (49)
Thus, by combining the above two equations, we can view the set πi(A(Qo)) as
πi(A(Q
o)) =
{
(x¯n, y¯n) ∈ T nQo : d(x¯
n, πi(f(π
−1
i (y¯
n)))) ≤ ∆+ δ
}
. (50)
In other words, the permuted set πi(A(Qo)) can be characterized by a composite function
πi(f(π
−1
i (·))).
With the sets πi(A(Qo)) and the functions πi(f(π−1i (·))) for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, we are ready to
construct a rate distortion code with side information. We assume that (Xn, Y n) are generated
i.i.d. according to distribution Qo. We will construct an encoding-decoding function pair (g′, ϕ′)
for all (xn, yn) ∈ T nQo as follows.
We define g′(xn, yn) = i if (xn, yn) ∈ πi(A(Qo)). If there exist multiple sets πi(A(Qo))
to which (xn, yn) belongs, we can arbitrarily pick one set and assign the index of the set to
the output of the function g′. Define QoY as the marginal distribution of Qo in Y . Then, for
i = 1, 2, . . . , k and yn ∈ T nQo
Y
, we define the decoding function ϕ′ as follows
ϕ′(i, yn) = πi(f(π
−1
i (y
n))), i = 1, 2, . . . , k. (51)
Due to the covering in (45), we obtain an encoding-decoding function pair (g′, ϕ′) for the rate-
distortion problem with side information available at both the encoder and decoder for every
(xn, yn) ∈ T nQo , which satisfies
||g′|| = k, (52)
d(xn, ϕ′(g′(xn, yn), yn)) ≤ ∆+ δ. (53)
Step 3 Blowing-up: In the previous step, we have construct a code (g′, ϕ′) for every sequence
pair (xn, yn) in the type T nQo . In this step, we will expand the code, first to the neighborhood of
the type T nQo , and then to the whole space X n×Yn. The expansion uses the Blowing-up lemma
[6, Chapter 5].
First, we expand the code we described in the previous step to the neighborhood of the type
T nQo . To do so, let us introduce the definition of the neighborhood of a set as follows.
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Definition 2 [6, Chapter 5] Given a set S ⊂ X n, we define the Hamming l neighborhood of
S as
Γ
l(S) , {xn ∈ X n : ∃x¯n ∈ S, s.t. dH(x
n, x¯n) ≤ l} , (54)
where dH represents the Hamming distance between two sequence pairs, i.e., the number of
positions in which the two sequence pairs differ.
Assume a sequence of positive integer ln with lnn converging to 0. We consider the ln
neighborhood of the type T nQo , i.e., Γln(T nQo). Based on Definition 2 and (45), we have
Γ
ln(T nQo) =
k⋃
i=1
Γ
ln(πi(A(Q
o))). (55)
For any (xn, yn) ∈ Γln(T nQo), we will construct a rate distortion code with side information
at both the encoder and decoder (g, ϕ) restricted to the ln neighborhood of the type T nQo ,
i.e., Γln(T nQo), from the rate distortion code (g′, ϕ′) defined on the type T nQo as described in
the previous step. The basic idea is that for (xn, yn) in the neighborhood of (x¯n, y¯n) ∈ T nQo , we
adopt the encoder-decoder pair (g′, ϕ′) for (x¯n, y¯n) as the encoder-decoder pair for (xn, yn). The
details are as follows.
The encoding function g on the set Γln(T nQo) includes two parts, i.e., g = (g1, g2). The function
g1 can be constructed in a similar way as we constructed the function g on the type T nQo in
the previous step. More specifically, for any (xn, yn) ∈ Γln(T nQo), we define g1(xn, yn) = i if
(xn, yn) ∈ Γln(πi(A(Q
o))). Based on (55), we know such i always exists. If there exist multiple
sets Γln(πi(A(Qo))) to which (xn, yn) belongs, we can arbitrarily pick one set and assign the
index of the set to the output of the function g1. Then we have
||g1|| = k. (56)
Once we determine that g1(xn, yn) = i, we can assert that there exists a sequence pair
(x¯n, y¯n) ∈ πi(A(Q
o)) such that
dH((x
n, yn), (x¯n, y¯n)) ≤ ln. (57)
We would like to adopt ϕ′(i, y¯n) as the decoding function ϕ(i, yn). However, y¯n is determined
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based on sequence pair (xn, yn). Therefore, the decoder, with only the knowledge of yn, can not
determine y¯n by itself. To overcome this problem, we need to design g2, i.e., the second part of
encoding function, to inform the decoder of y¯n as follows.
Let us consider yn, the second sequence in the pair (xn, yn). We construct a ln Hamming
neighborhood Γln(yn) around the sequence yn, which is called a Hamming ball, and give every
sequence in Γln(yn) an index. Obviously, the sequence y¯n can be uniquely determined by the
sequence yn together with the index of y¯n with respect to yn, say j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,
∣∣Γln(yn)∣∣}.
Then g2, the second part of the encoding function g, can be defined as the above index, i.e.,
g2(x
n, yn) = j, (58)
and we have
||g2|| =
∣∣Γln(yn)∣∣ , (59)
where the size of the Hamming ball satisfies [6, Lemma 5.1]
1
n
log
∣∣Γln(yn)∣∣ ≤ h
(
ln
n
)
+
ln
n
log |Y|, (60)
and h(·) represents the binary entropy function. Therefore, the size of the function g is
||g|| = ||g1|| · ||g2|| = k
∣∣Γln(yn)∣∣ . (61)
Note that for (xn, yn) ∈ Γln(T nQo), we have yn ∈ Γln(T nQo
Y
). Thus, we expand the domain of
the second argument of the function ϕ from the type T nQo
Y
to its ln neighborhood Γln(T nQo
Y
).
Assume the decoder observes yn ∈ Γln(T nQo
Y
), and obtain g(xn, yn) from the encoder as follows
g(xn, yn) = (i, j). (62)
From yn and j, we can determine the sequence y¯n in the type T nQo
Y
. We then define ϕ((i, j), yn) =
ϕ′(i, y¯n) for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, where the decoding function ϕ′(i, y¯n) was defined in the previous
step.
Based on the definition of Γln(πi(A(Qo))) , for every (xn, yn) ∈ Γln(πi(A(Qo))), there exists
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a (x¯n, y¯n) ∈ πi(A(Q
o)) such that
dH((x
n, yn), (x¯n, y¯n)) ≤ ln, (63)
and from the definition of πi(A(Qo)), we know that
d(x¯n, ϕ′(i, y¯n)) ≤ ∆+ δ. (64)
Therefore, we have
d(xn, ϕ(g(xn, yn), yn)) = d(xn, ϕ′(g′(x¯n, y¯n), y¯n))
≤ d(x¯n, ϕ′(g′(x¯n, y¯n), y¯n)) + dM
ln
n
, (65)
where (65) is because xn and x¯n at most differ in ln positions and
dM , max
(x,xˆ)∈X×Xˆ
d(x, xˆ). (66)
Hence, with the above definition of (g, ϕ), we have that
||g|| = k
∣∣Γln(yn)∣∣ , (67)
d(xn, ϕ(g(xn, yn), yn)) ≤ ∆+ δ + dM
ln
n
. (68)
where (68) follows from (64) and (65).
Finally, we expand the rate-distortion code (g, ϕ) to all (xn, yn) ∈ X n × Yn. For (xn, yn) /∈
Γ
ln(T nQo), we define g(xn, yn) = 0. And we define ϕ(0, yn) to be an arbitrary sequence in Xˆ n.
Therefore, for (g, ϕ) defined on X n × Yn, we have
1
n
log ||g|| ≤ E −D(Qo||P ) + 3ǫn + δ +
log(nH(Qo))
n
+ h
(
ln
n
)
+
ln
n
log |Y|, (69)
where (69) follows from (46), (61) and (60).
We use blowing up lemma to calculate the average distortion for the rate distortion code we
constructed above. We restate the blowing up lemma as follows.
Lemma 2 (Blowing up) [6, Lemma 5.4] To any finite set X and sequence ǫn → 0, there
exist a sequence of positive integers ln with lnn → 0 and a sequence τn → 1 such that for any
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distribution Q defined on X and every n,A ⊂ X n
Qn(A) ≥ exp(−nǫn) (70)
implies
Qn(Γln(A)) ≥ τn. (71)
In our case, from [6, Lemma 2.3], we have that for any sequence ǫn → 0 and sufficiently
large n
(Qo)n
(
T nQo
)
≥ (n+ 1)−|X ||Y| ≥ exp(−nǫn). (72)
Thus, from Blowing up lemma, we have that there exists a sequence ηn → 1 such that
(Qo)n
(
Γ
ln
(
T nQo
))
≥ ηn. (73)
Therefore, for (g, ϕ) defined on X n × Yn,
Pr
(
d(xn, ϕ(g(xn, yn), yn)) ≤ ∆+ δ + dM
ln
n
)
≥ (Qo)n
(
Γ
ln
(
T nQo
))
≥ ηn, (74)
where (74) follows from (65) and (73). The inequality in (74) leads to
E(d(Xn, ϕ(g(Xn, Y n), Y n)) ≤ ∆+ δ + dM
ln
n
+ dM(1− ηn). (75)
Thus, if we have a deception function, which under the distortion constraint ∆ can achieve the
deception exponent
E = min
Q
D(Q||P ) +RSI(Q,∆)− α, (76)
for some α > 0, then we can construct a rate distortion code with side information at both the
encoder and decoder, where (Xn, Y n) is generated i.i.d. according to the distribution Qo, that
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satisfies
1
n
log ||g||
≤ min
Q
{D(Q||P ) +RSI(Q,∆)} − α−D(Q
o||P ) + 3ǫn + δ +
log(nH(Qo))
n
+ h
(
ln
n
)
+
ln
n
log |Y|
≤ RSI(Q
o,∆)− α + 3ǫn + δ +
log(nH(Qo))
n
+ h
(
ln
n
)
+
ln
n
log |Y|, (77)
and
E(d(Xn, ϕ(g(Xn, Y n), Y n)) ≤ ∆+ δ + dM
ln
n
+ dM(1− ηn). (78)
Since the rate distortion function RSI(Qo,∆) is a continuous function of ∆, the above result
contradicts with the result in the rate distortion problem with side information at both the encoder
and decoder. This concludes the proof of the converse.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the probability of successful deception of an uncompressed biometric
authentication system with side information at the adversary. We found the optimal exponent
of the deception probability by providing the proofs of both the achievability and the converse.
The results are proved by exploiting a connection between the problem of deception with side
information and the rate distortion problem with side information at both the encoder and decoder.
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